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Abstract 
 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a dynamic wireless network that can be 
formed without any pre-existing infrastructure in which each node can act as a 
router. MANET has no clear line of defense, so, it is accessible to both legitimate 
network users and malicious attackers. In the presence of malicious nodes, one 
of the main challenges in MANET is to design the robust security solution that 
can protect MANET from various routing attacks. Different mechanisms have 
been proposed using various cryptographic techniques to countermeasure the 
routing attacks against MANET. However, these mechanisms are not suitable for 
MANET resource constraints, i.e., limited bandwidth and battery power, because 
they introduce heavy traffic load to exchange and verifying keys. In this paper, 
the current security issues in MANET are investigated. Particularly, we have 
examined different routing attacks, such as flooding, blackhole, link spoofing, 
wormhole, and colluding misrelay attacks, as well as existing solutions to protect 
MANET protocols. 
 
Keywords: MANET security, Routing protocols, Cryptography, Communications and data security, Shared 
wireless channel. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A MANET is a collection of mobile nodes that can communicate with each other without the use 
of predefined infrastructure or centralized administration. Due to self-organize and rapidly deploy 
capability, MANET can be applied to different applications including battlefield communications, 
emergency relief scenarios, law enforcement, public meeting, virtual class room and other 
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security-sensitive computing environments. There are 15 major issues and sub-issues involving 
in MANET [6] such as routing, multicasting/broadcasting, location service, clustering, mobility 
management, TCP/UDP, IP addressing, multiple access, radio interface, bandwidth 
management, power management, security, fault tolerance, QoS/multimedia, and 
standards/products. Currently, the routing, power management, bandwidth management, radio 
interface, and security are hot topics in MANET research. Although in this paper we only focus on 
the routing protocols and security issues in MANET. The routing protocols in MANET may 
generally be categorized as: table-driven/proactive and source-initiated (demand-driven)/reactive. 
In proactive routing protocols, such as the optimized link state routing (OLSR) [4], nodes obtain 
routes by periodic exchange of topology information. In reactive routing protocols, such as the ad 
hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) protocol [19, 20], nodes find routes only when required.  
The overall goal of the security solutions for MANET is to provide security services including 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, and availability to the mobile users. In order to 
achieve to this goal, the security solution should provide complete protection spanning the entire 
protocol stack. We can categories MANET security in 5 layers, such as Application layer, 
Transport layer, Network layer, Link layer, and Physical layer. However, we only focus on the 
network layer, which is related to security issues to protect the ad hoc routing and forwarding 
protocols. From the security design perspective, the MANETs have no clear line of defense. 
Unlike wired networks that have dedicated routers, each mobile node in an ad hoc network may 
function as a router and forward packets for other peer nodes. The wireless channel is accessible 
to both legitimate network users and malicious attackers. There is no well defined place where 
traffic monitoring or access control mechanisms can be deployed. As a result, the boundary that 
separates the inside network from the outside world becomes blurred. On the other hand, the 
existing ad hoc routing protocols, such as (AODV) [19, 20], (DSR) [11], and wireless MAC 
protocols, such as 802.11 [14], typically assume a trusted and cooperative environment. As a 
result, a malicious attacker can readily become a router and disrupt network operations by 
intentionally disobeying the protocol specifications.  
Recently, several research efforts [8, 9, 13, 23, 26] introduced to counter against these malicious 
attacks. Most of the previous work has focused mainly on providing preventive schemes to 
protect the routing protocol in a MANET. Most of these schemes are based on key management 
or encryption techniques to prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the network. In general, the 
main drawback of these approaches is that they introduce a heavy traffic load to exchange and 
verify keys, which is very expensive in terms of the bandwidth-constraint for MANET nodes with 
limited battery and limited computational capabilities. The MANET protocols are facing different 
routing attacks, such as flooding, blackhole, link withholding, link spoofing, replay, wormhole, and 
colluding misrelay attack. A comprehensive study of these routing attacks and countermeasures 
against these attacks in MANET can be found in [7]       
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next section, we discuss routing protocols in 
MANET. Section 3 discusses current routing attacks as well as countermeasures against such 
attacks in existing MANET protocols. Finally, we summarize the paper.    
 
2. ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN MANET 
MANET routing protocols can be categorized into 2 classes as: table-driven/proactive and 
source-initiated (demand-driven)/reactive. In the following sections, we present the overview of 
these protocols.  
 
2.1 Table-driven routing protocols 
Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain consistent, up-to-date routing information from 
each node to every other node in the network. These protocols require each node to maintain one 
or more tables to store routing information, and they respond to changes in network topology by 
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propagating updates throughout the network in order to maintain a consistent network view. The 
areas in which they differ are the number of necessary routing-related tables and the methods by 
which changes in network structure are broadcast. The following sections discuss some of the 
existing table-driven ad hoc routing protocols. 
 
2.1.1 Destination-sequenced distance-vector (DSDV) 
The Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) routing protocol [18] is a table-driven 
algorithm based on Bellman-Ford routing mechanism [2]. The improvements made by [18] to the 
Bellman-Ford algorithm include freedom from loops in routing tables. In DSDV every node in the 
network maintains a routing table in which all of the possible destinations within the network and 
the number of hops to each destination are recorded. Each entry is marked with a sequence 
number assigned by the destination node. The sequence numbers enable the mobile nodes to 
distinguish stale routes from new ones, thereby avoiding the formation of routing loops. Routing 
table updates are periodically transmitted throughout the network in order to maintain table 
consistency. To help alleviate the potentially large amount of network traffic that such updates 
can generate, route updates can employ two possible types of packets: full dump and smaller 
incremental packets.  Each of these broadcasts should fit into a standard-size of network protocol 
data unit (NPDU), thereby decreasing the amount of traffic generated. The mobile nodes maintain 
an additional table where they store the data sent in the incremental routing information packets. 
 
New route broadcasts contain the address of the destination, the number of hops to reach the 
destination, the sequence number of the information received regarding the destination, as well 
as a new sequence number unique to the broadcast [18]. The route labeled with the most recent 
sequence number is always used. In the event that two updates have the same sequence 
number, the route with the smaller metric is used in order to optimize (shorten) the path. Mobiles 
also keep track of the settling time of routes, or the weighted average time that routes to a 
destination will fluctuate before the route with the best metric is received (see [18]). By delaying 
the broadcast of a routing update by the length of the settling time, mobiles can reduce network 
traffic and optimize routes by eliminating those broadcasts that would occur if a better route was 
discovered in the very near future. 
 
2.1.2 Optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol 
Optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol [4] is a proactive routing protocol and based on 
periodic exchange of topology information. The key concept of OLSR is the use of multipoint relay 
(MPR) to provide an efficient flooding mechanism by reducing the number of transmissions 
required. In OLSR, each node selects its own MPR from its neighbors. Each MPR node maintains 
the list of nodes that were selected as an MPR; this list is called an MPR selector list. Only nodes 
selected as MPR nodes are responsible for advertising, as well as forwarding an MPR selector 
list advertised by other MPRs. Generally, two types of routing messages are used in the OLSR 
protocol, namely, a HELLO message and a topology control (TC) message. A HELLO message is 
the message that is used for neighbor sensing and MPR selection.  
 
In OLSR, each node generates a HELLO message periodically. A node’s HELLO message 
contains its own address and the list of its one-hop neighbors. By exchanging HELLO messages, 
each node can learn a complete topology up to two hops. HELLO messages are exchanged 
locally by neighbor nodes and are not forwarded further to other nodes. A TC message is the 
message that is used for route calculation. In OLSR, each MPR node advertises TC messages 
periodically. A TC message contains the list of the sender’s MPR selector. In OLSR, only MPR 
nodes are responsible for forwarding TC messages. Upon receiving TC messages from all of the 
MPR nodes, each node can learn the partial network topology and can build a route to every 
node in the network. For MPR selection, each node selects a set of its MPR nodes that can 
forward its routing messages. In OLSR, a node selects its MPR set that can reach all its two-hop 
neighbors. In case there are multiple choices, the minimum set is selected as an MPR set. 
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2.1.3 Wireless routing protocol (WRP)  
Wireless routing protocols (WRP) [12, 24] is a path-finding algorithm with the exception of 
avoiding the count-to-infinity problem by forcing each node to perform consistency checks of 
predecessor information reported by all its neighbors. WRP is a loop free routing protocol. Each 
node maintains 4 tables: distance table, routing table, linkcost table & message retransmission 
list table. Link changes are propagated using update messages sent between neighboring nodes. 
Hello messages are periodically exchanged between neighbors. This protocol avoids count-to-
infinity problem by forcing each node to check predecessor information. 
 
2.1.4 Clusterhead gateway switch routing (CGSR) protocol 
Clusterhead gateway switch routing (CGSR) protocol is based on a cluster multihop mobile 
wireless network with several heuristic routing schemes [3]. The authors state that by having a 
cluster head controlling a group of ad hoc nodes, a framework for code separation (among 
clusters), channel access, routing, and bandwidth allocation can be achieved. A cluster head 
selection algorithm is utilized to elect a node as the cluster head using a distributed algorithm 
within the cluster. However, frequent cluster head changes can adversely affect routing protocol 
performance since nodes are busy in cluster head selection rather than packet relaying. Hence, 
instead of invoking cluster head reselection every time the cluster membership changes, a Least 
Cluster Change (LCC) clustering algorithm is introduced. Using LCC, cluster heads only change 
when two cluster heads come into contact, or when a node moves out of contact of all other 
cluster heads.  
 
CGSR uses DSDV as the underlying routing scheme, and hence has much of the same overhead 
as DSDV. However, it modifies DSDV by using a hierarchical cluster-head-to-gate-way routing 
approach to route traffic from source to destination. Gateway nodes are nodes that are within 
communication range of two or more cluster heads. A packet sent by a node is first routed to its 
cluster head, and then the packet is routed from the cluster head to a gateway to another cluster 
head, and so on until the cluster head of the destination node is reached. The packet is then 
transmitted to the destination.  
 
2.2 On demand-driven reactive protocols 
On demand protocols create routes only when desired by source nodes [19, 11, 17 24]. When a 
node requires a route to destination, it initiates route discovery process within the network. This 
process is completed once a route is found or all possible route permutations are examined. 
Once a route is discovered and established, it is maintained by route maintenance procedure until 
either destination becomes inaccessible along every path from source or route is no longer 
desired.  
 
2.2.1 Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) 
AODV [19, 20] is an improvement of DSDV algorithm previously described. It is typically 
minimizes the number of required broadcasts by creating routes on a demand basis, while DSDV 
algorithm maintain a complete list of routes. The authors of AODV classify it as a pure on-
demand route acquisition system, since nodes that are not on a selected path do not maintain 
routing acquisition or participate in routing table exchanges. In AODV, when a source node S 
wants to send a data packet to a destination node D and does not have a route to D, it initiates 
route discovery by broadcasting a route request (RREQ) to its neighbors. The immediate 
neighbors who receive this RREQ rebroadcast the same RREQ to their neighbors. This process 
is repeated until the RREQ reaches the destination node. Upon receiving the first arrived RREQ, 
the destination node sends a route reply (RREP) to the source node through the reverse path 
where the RREQ arrived. The same RREQ that arrives later will be ignored by the destination 
node. In addition, AODV enables intermediate nodes that have sufficiently fresh routes (with 
Rashid Hafeez Khokhar, Md Asri Ngadi & Satria Mandala 
International Journal of Computer Science and Security, volume (2) issue (3) 22 
 
destination sequence number equal or greater than the one in the RREQ) to generate and send 
an RREP to the source node.  
 
2.2.2 Dynamic source routing (DSR) 
Dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol is an on-demand routing protocol that is based on the 
concept of source routing [11]. Mobile nodes are required to maintain route caches that contain 
the source routes of which the mobile is aware. Entries in the route cache are continually updated 
as new routes are learned. The protocol consists of two major phases: route discovery and route 
maintenance. When a mobile node has a packet to send to some destination, it first consults its 
route cache to determine whether it already has a route to the destination. If it has an unexpired 
route to the destination, it will use this route to send the packet. On the other hand, if the node 
does not have such a route, it initiates route discovery by broad- casting a route request packet. 
This route request contains the address of the destination, along with the source node’s address 
and a unique identification number. Each node receiving the packet checks whether it knows of a 
route to the destination. If it does not, it adds its own address to the route record of the packet 
and then forwards the packet along its outgoing links. To limit the number of route requests 
propagated on the outgoing links of a node, a mobile only forwards the route request if the 
request has not yet been seen by the mobile and if the mobile’s address does not already appear 
in the route record. A route reply is generated when the route request reaches either the 
destination itself, or an intermediate node which contains in its route cache an unexpired route to 
the destination. By the time the packet reaches either the destination or such an intermediate 
node, it contains a route record yielding the sequence of hops taken.  
 
2.2.3 Temporary-ordered routing algorithm (TORA) 
The Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) is a highly adaptive loop-free distributed 
routing algorithm based on the concept of link reversal [17]. TORA is proposed to operate in a 
highly dynamic mobile networking environment. It is source initiated and provides multiple routes 
for any desired source/destination pair. The key design concept of TORA is the localization of 
control messages to a very small set of nodes near the occurrence of a topological change. To 
accomplish this, nodes need to maintain routing information about adjacent (one-hop) nodes. The 
protocol performs three basic functions: route creation, route maintenance, and route erasure. 
 
2.2.4 Relative distance micro diversity routing (RDMAR) 
Relative Distance Micro diversity Routing (RDMAR) protocol estimates the distance between two 
nodes using the relative distance estimation algorithm in radio loops. RDMAR is a source initiated 
and having features similar to associativity based routing (ABR) protocol. RDMAR [19, 20, 17, 24] 
limits the range of route searching in order to save the cost of flooding a route request message 
into the entire wireless area. It is assumed in RDMAR that all ad hoc mobile hosts are migrating 
at the same fixed speed. This assumption can make good practical estimation of relative distance 
very difficult. 
 
3. ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANET 
The malicious node(s) can attacks in MANET using different ways, such as sending fake 
messages several times, fake routing information, and advertising fake links to disrupt routing 
operations. In the following subsection, current routing attacks and its countermeasures against 
MANET protocols are discussed in detail.  
 
3.1 Flooding attack 
In flooding attack, attacker exhausts the network resources, such as bandwidth and to consume a 
node’s resources, such as computational and battery power or to disrupt the routing operation to 
cause severe degradation in network performance. For example, in AODV protocol, a malicious 
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node can send a large number of RREQs in a short period to a destination node that does not 
exist in the network. Because no one will reply to the RREQs, these RREQs will flood the whole 
network. As a result, all of the node battery power, as well as network bandwidth will be 
consumed and could lead to denial-of-service.  
 
A simple mechanism proposed to prevent the flooding attack in the AODV protocol [25]. In this 
approach, each node monitors and calculates the rate of its neighbors’ RREQ. If the RREQ rate 
of any neighbor exceeds the predefined threshold, the node records the ID of this neighbor in a 
blacklist. Then, the node drops any future RREQs from nodes that are listed in the blacklist. The 
limitation of this approach is that it cannot prevent against the flooding attack in which the flooding 
rate is below the threshold. Another drawback of this approach is that if a malicious node 
impersonates the ID of a legitimate node and broadcasts a large number of RREQs, other nodes 
might put the ID of this legitimate node on the blacklist by mistake. In [5], the authors show that a 
flooding attack can decrease throughput by 84 percent. The authors proposed an adaptive 
technique to mitigate the effect of a flooding attack in the AODV protocol. This technique is based 
on statistical analysis to detect malicious RREQ floods and avoid the forwarding of such packets. 
Similar to [25], in this approach, each node monitors the RREQ it receives and maintains a count 
of RREQs received from each sender during the preset time period. The RREQs from a sender 
whose RREQ rate is above the threshold will be dropped without forwarding. Unlike the method 
proposed in [25], where the threshold is set to be fixed, this approach determines the threshold 
based on a statistical analysis of RREQs. The key advantage of this approach is that it can 
reduce the impact of the attack for varying flooding rates.  
 
3.2 Blackhole attack 
In a blackhole attack, a malicious node sends fake routing information, claiming that it has an 
optimum route and causes other good nodes to route data packets through the malicious one. 
For example, in AODV, the attacker can send a fake RREP (including a fake destination 
sequence number that is fabricated to be equal or higher than the one contained in the RREQ) to 
the source node, claiming that it has a sufficiently fresh route to the destination node. This causes 
the source node to select the route that passes through the attacker. Therefore, all traffic will be 
routed through the attacker, and therefore, the attacker can misuse or discard the traffic. Figure 4 
shows an example of a blackhole attack, where attacker A sends a fake RREP to the source 
node S, claiming that it has a sufficiently fresher route than other nodes. Since the attacker’s 
advertised sequence number is higher than other nodes’ sequence numbers, the source node S 
will choose the route that passes through node A.  
 
 
Figure 1: Blackhole attack on AODV 
 
The route confirmation request (CREQ) and route confirmation reply (CREP) is introduced in [15] 
to avoid the blackhole attack. In this approach, the intermediate node not only sends RREPs to 
the source node but also sends CREQs to its next-hop node toward the destination node. After 
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receiving a CREQ, the next-hop node looks up its cache for a route to the destination. If it has the 
route, it sends the CREP to the source. Upon receiving the CREP, the source node can confirm 
the validity of the path by comparing the path in RREP and the one in CREP. If both are matched, 
the source node judges that the route is correct. One drawback of this approach is that it cannot 
avoid the blackhole attack in which two consecutive nodes work in collusion, that is, when the 
next-hop node is a colluding attacker sending CREPs that support the incorrect path. In [1], the 
authors proposed a solution that requires a source node to wait until a RREP packet arrives from 
more than two nodes. Upon receiving multiple RREPs, the source node checks whether there is a 
shared hop or not. If there is, the source node judges that the route is safe. The main draw back 
of this solution is that it introduces time delay, because it must wait until multiple RREPs arrive. In 
another attempt [10], the authors analyzed the blackhole attack and showed that a malicious 
node must increase the destination sequence number sufficiently to convince the source node 
that the route provided is sufficiently enough. Based on this analysis, the authors propose a 
statistical based anomaly detection approach to detect the blackhole attack, based on differences 
between the destination sequence numbers of the received RREPs. The key advantage of this 
approach is that it can detect the attack at low cost without introducing extra routing traffic, and it 
does not require modification of the existing protocol. However, false positives are the main 
drawback of this approach due to the nature of anomaly detection.  
 
3.3 Link spoofing attack 
In a link spoofing attack, a malicious node advertises fake links with non-neighbors to disrupt 
routing operations. For example, in the OLSR protocol, an attacker can advertise a fake link with 
a target’s two-hop neighbors. This causes the target node to select the malicious node to be its 
MPR. As an MPR node, a malicious node can then manipulate data or routing traffic, for example, 
modifying or dropping the routing traffic or performing other types of DoS attacks. Figure 2 shows 
an example of the link spoofing attack in an OLSR MANET. In the figure, we assume that node A 
is the attacking node, and node T is the target to be attacked. Before the attack, both nodes A 
and E are MPRs for node T. During the link spoofing attack, node A advertises a fake link with 
node T’s two-hop neighbor, that is, node D. According to the OLSR protocol, node T will select 
the malicious node A as its only MPR since node A is the minimum set that reaches node T’s 
two-hop neighbors. By being node T’s only MPR, node A can then drop or withhold the routing 
traffic generated by node T. 
          
Figure 2: Link spoofing attack 
 
A location information-based detection method is proposed [22] to detect link spoofing attack by 
using cryptography with a GPS and a time stamp. This approach requires each node to advertise 
its position obtained by the GPS and the time stamp to enable each node to obtain the location 
information of the other nodes. This approach detects the link spoofing by calculating the distance 
between two nodes that claim to be neighbors and checking the likelihood that the link is based 
on a maximum transmission range. The main drawback of this approach is that it might not work 
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in a situation where all MANET nodes are not equipped with a GPS. Furthermore, attackers can 
still advertise false information and make it hard for other nodes to detect the attack.  
 
In [8], the authors show that a malicious node that advertises fake links with a target’s two-hop 
neighbors can successfully make the target choose it as the only MPR. Through simulations, the 
authors show that link spoofing can have a devastating impact on the target node. Then, the 
authors present a technique to detect the link spoofing attack by adding two-hop information to a 
HELLO message. In particular, the proposed solution requires each node to advertise its two-hop 
neighbors to enable each node to learn complete topology up to three hops and detect the 
inconsistency when the link spoofing attack is launched. The main advantage of this approach is 
that it can detect the link spoofing attack without using special hardware such as a GPS or 
requiring time synchronization. One limitation of this approach is that it might not detect link 
spoofing with nodes further away than three hops.  
 
3.4 Wormhole attack 
A wormhole attack [13] is one of the most sophisticated and severe attacks in MANETs. In this 
attack, a pair of colluding attackers record packets at one location and replay them at another 
location using a private high speed network. The seriousness of this attack is that it can be 
launched against all communications that provide authenticity and confidentiality. Figure 3 shows 
an example of the wormhole attack against a reactive routing protocol. In the figure, we assume 
that nodes A1 and A2 are two colluding attackers and that node S is the target to be attacked. 
During the attack, when source node S broadcasts an RREQ to find a route to a destination node  
 
 
      Figure 3: Wormhole attack on reactive routing 
 
D, its neighbors C and E forward the RREQ as usual. However, node A1, which received the 
RREQ, forwarded by node C, records and tunnels the RREQ to its colluding partner A2. Then, 
node A2 rebroadcasts this RREQ to its neighbor H. Since this RREQ passed through a high-
speed channel, this RREQ will reach node D first. Therefore, node D will choose route D-H-C-S 
to unicast an RREP to the source node S and ignore the same RREQ that arrived later. As a 
result, S will select route S-H-D that indeed passed through A1 and A2 to send its data.  
 
In [13], packet leashes are proposed to detect and defend against the wormhole attack. In 
particular, the authors proposed two types of leashes: temporal leashes and geographical 
leashes. For the temporal leash approach, each node computes the packet expiration time, te, 
based on the speed of light c and includes the expiration time, te, in its packet to prevent the 
packet from traveling further than a specific distance, L. The receiver of the packet checks 
whether or not the packet expires by comparing its current time and the te in the packet. The 
authors also proposed TIK, which is used to authenticate the expiration time that can otherwise 
be modified by the malicious node. The main drawback of the temporal leash is that it requires all 
nodes to have tightly synchronized clocks. For the geographical leash, each node must know its 
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own position and have loosely synchronized clocks. In this approach, a sender of a packet 
includes its current position and the sending time. Therefore, a receiver can judge neighbor 
relations by computing distance between itself and the sender of the packet. The advantage of 
geographic leashes over temporal leashes is that the time synchronization needs not to be highly 
tight.  
 
In [22], the authors offer protection against a wormhole attack in the OLSR protocol. This 
approach is based on location information and requires the deployment of a public key 
infrastructure and time-stamp synchronization between all nodes that is similar to the geographic 
leashes proposed in [13]. In this approach, a sender of a HELLO message includes its current 
position and current time in its HELLO message. Upon receiving a HELLO message from a 
neighbor, a node calculates the distance between itself and its neighbor, based on a position 
provided in the HELLO message. If the distance is more than the maximum transmission range, 
the node judges that the HELLO message is highly suspicious and might be tunneled by a 
wormhole attack. In [21], the authors propose a statistical analysis of multipath (SAM), which is 
an approach to detect the wormhole attack by using multipath routing. This approach determines 
the attack by calculating the relative frequency of each ink that appears in all of the obtained 
routes from one route discovery. In this solution, a link that has the highest relative frequency is 
identified as the wormhole link. The advantage of this approach is that it introduces limited 
overhead when applied in multipath routing. However, it might not work in a non-multipath routing 
protocol, such as a pure AODV protocol.  
 
3.5 Colluding misrelay attack 
In colluding misrelay attack, multiple attackers work in collusion to modify or drop routing packets 
to disrupt routing operation in a MANET. This attack is difficult to detect by using the conventional 
methods such as watchdog and pathrater [16]. Figure 4 shows an example of this attack. 
Consider the case where node A1 forwards routing packets for node T. In the figure, the first 
attacker A1 forwards routing packets as usual to avoid being detected by node T. However, the 
second attacker A2 drops or modifies these routing packets. In [8] the authors discuss this type of 
attack in OLSR protocol and show that a pair of malicious nodes can disrupt up to 100 percent of 
data packets in the OLSR MANET. 
 
                 
          Figure 4: Colluding misrealy attack 
 
A conventional acknowledgment-based approach might detect this type of attack in a MANET, 
especially in a proactive MANET, but because routing packets destined to all nodes in the 
network require all nodes to return an ACK, this could lead to a large overhead, which is 
considered to be inefficient. In [9], the author proposes a method to detect an attack in which 
multiple malicious nodes attempt to drop packets by requiring each node to tune their 
transmission power when they forward packets. As an example, the author studies the case 
where two colluding attackers drop packets. The proposed solution requires each node to 
increase its transmission power twice to detect such an attack. However, this approach might not 
detect the attack in which three colluding attackers work in collusion. In general, the main draw 
back of this approach is that even if we require each node to increase transmission power to be K 
times, we still cannot detect the attack in which K + 1 attackers work in collusion to drop packets. 
Therefore, further work must be done to counter against this type of attack efficiently. 
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4. SUMMARY 
A MANET is a promising network technology which is based on a self-organized and rapidly 
deployed network. Due to its great features, MANET attracts different real world application areas 
where the networks topology changes very quickly. However, many researchers are trying to 
remove main weaknesses of MANET such as limited bandwidth, battery power, computational 
power, and security. Although, we have only discussed the security issues in this paper, 
particularly routing attacks and its existing countermeasures. The existing security solutions of 
wire networks cannot be applied directly to MANET, which makes a MANET much more 
vulnerable to security attacks. In this paper, we have discussed current routing attacks and 
countermeasures against MANET protocols. Some solutions that rely on cryptography and key 
management seem promising, but they are too expensive for resource constrained in MANET. 
They still not perfect in terms of tradeoffs between effectiveness and efficiency. Some solutions 
work well in the presence of one malicious node, they might not be applicable in the presence of 
multiple colluding attackers. In addition, some may require special hardware such as a GPS or a 
modification to the existing protocol.  
 
Because of the characteristic of dynamic wireless network, MANET presents the following set of 
unique challenges to secure. Dynamic network: the topology of MANETs is highly dynamic as 
mobile nodes freely roam in network, join or leave the network on their own will, and fail 
occasionally. The wireless channel is also subject to interferences and errors, exhibiting volatile 
characteristics in terms of bandwidth and delay. Mobile users roaming in the network may request 
for anytime, anywhere security services. Resource constraints: the wireless channel is bandwidth 
constrained and shared among multiple networking entities. The computation and energy 
resources of a mobile node are also constrained. No clear line of defense: MANET has not offer a 
clear line of defense. Moreover, the wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate users and 
malicious attackers. The boundary that separate the inside network from the outside world 
becomes blurred. Device with weak protection: portable devices, as well as the system security 
information they store, are vulnerable to compromises.  
 
Security solutions are important issues for MANET, especially for those selecting-sensitive 
applications, have to meet the following design goals while addressing the above challenges. 
Availability: ensures the survivability of the network services despite Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks. A DoS attack could be launched at any layer of ad hoc network. On the physical and 
media access control layers, an adversary could employ jamming to interfere with communication 
on physical channels. The security service is highly available on the network layer at anytime and 
at anywhere. On the higher layers, an adversary could bring down high-level services. Efficiency: 
the solution should be efficient in terms of communication overhead, energy consumption and 
computationally affordable by a portable device. Authentication: enables a mobile node to ensure 
the identity of the peer node it is communicating with. Without authentication, an attacker would 
impersonate a node, thus gaining unauthorized access to resource and sensitive information and 
interfering with the operation of other nodes. Integrity: guarantees that a message being 
transmitted is never corrupted. A message could be corrupted because of being failures, such as 
radio propagation impairment, or because of malicious attacks on the network. Confidentiality: 
ensures that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized entities. Network transmission 
of sensitive information, such as strategic or tactical military information, requires confidentiality. 
Non-repudiation: ensures that the original message cannot deny having sent the message. Non-
repudiation is useful for detection and isolation of compromised mobile nodes. 
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